Maintenance surcharge for range use at the Pacific Missile Test Center by Corbett, James T.
MAINTENANCE SURCHARGE FOR RANGE USE AT






MAINTENANCE SURCHARGE FOR RANGE USE AT




Thesis Advisor: Robert B. Cunningham









2. OOVT ACCESSION NO 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtltlo)
MAINTENANCE SURCHARGE FOR RANGE USE AT
THE PACIFIC MISSILE TEST CENTER
S. TYRE OF REPORT * PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis
September 1979
• PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORf*;
James T. Corbett
• CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERS
I. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9 3940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT. TASK
AREA * WORK UNIT NUMBERS





IS. NUMBER OF PAGES
106
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME * AOORESSfU dlllarmnt Irom Controlling Olllco) IS- SECURITY CLASS, (ol thla ripon)
Unclassified
1S«. DCCLASSIFI CATION/ DOWNGRADING
SCHEDULE
IS. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol thla Kapott)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (oi 'Mo abattmct ontarod In Block 30. II dlttoront from Raport)
IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES






20. ABSTRACT (Contlnua on ravotao tldo II nocaaamwy and idontltr by block mambot)
The Pacific Missile Test Center, PMTC, is utilized by various
DOD components to test and evaluate weapons systems. Range
facilities include tracking and surveillance radar, telemetry,
communication, recording and command/control/destruct instrumen-
tation systems. PMTC is a component of DOD's Major Range and
Test Facility Base and is subject to operating under a Uniform
Funding Policy.









SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAOE (9hon Data tntorod)

Unclassified
fgeujWTv ei*iti>tc*TiQM o* Twit »»oc<-«»%«w n.« i»n>»<
Engineering and Design Department that a surcharge system be
developed to levy instrumentation maintenance costs on range
users. The DOD organization for RDT&E and Weapon Systems
Acquisition is discussed in brief. This is followed by a
detailed examination of the Uniform Funding Policy and
Industrial Maintenance Principles . The PMTC Financial Manage-
ment System is presented and surcharge implementation problems
are identified. A conclusion is made to effectuate a surcharge;









N 01O2-014-6601 l $fcu««»v CLAMirie*Tio»i or twh ^*otrw.«« o«m *»'•»•-)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
MAINTENANCE SURCHARGE FOR RANGE USE AT
THE PACIFIC MISSILE TEST CENTER
by
James T. Corbett
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., Merrimack College, 19 70
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






The Pacific Missile Test Center, PMTC, is utilized by
various DOD components to test and evaluate weapons systems.
Range facilities include tracking and surveillance radar,
telemetry, communication, recording and command/control/
destruct instrumentation systems. PMTC is a component of
DOD's Major Range and Test Facility Base and is subject to
operating under a Uniform Funding Policy.
This thesis investigates the proposal made by PMTC's
Engineering and Design Department that a surcharge system be
developed to levy instrumentation maintenance costs on range
users. The DOD organization for RDT&E and Weapons Systems
Acquisition is discussed in brief. This is followed by a
detailed examination of the Uniform Funding Policy and
Industrial Maintenance Principles. The PMTC Financial Man-
agement System is presented and surcharge implementation
problems are identified. A conclusion is made to effectuate
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While testifying before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on July 23, 19 79, General David C. Jones, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated:
"We consider it absolutely essential that if the nation
accepts the Salt II agreement, it does so with a full
understanding that we will be required to undertake a
series of important strategic modernization programs in
order to maintain strategic parity within limits agreed
upon. " / Ref . 1, P. 2/
During the same hearings, Defense Secretary Harold Brown
said that "defense spending must increase to counter the Soviet
military buildup."
_
Ref. 1, p. 2/ This position is emerging
as a central theme of the government's effort to win ratifica-
tion of the treaty, i.e., the need to build new weapons despite
the limits in the agreement with the Soviets.
A critical issue facing today's military leaders is the
development and acquisition of the weapon systems which are
required to meet national defense needs. Spiraling costs
underscore the facts that the development and production of
modern weapons systems requires a major commitment of the
nation's resources and at the same time creates long range
commitments for future budget dollars. Weapons acquisition
has received public notoriety for well documented cases of
cost overruns. It is imperative that new weapons are procurred
with DOD management emphasizing that cost effectiveness be a
primary management tenet.

Test and Evaluation, T&E, effort is tantamount to an
efficient and effective procurement system. DOD policy states
that the T&E "commence as early as possible and carry on through-
out the acquisition process to assess and reduce acquisition
risks and evaluate operational effectiveness and operational
suitability of the system being developed." /Ref. 2, p. 3/
A major component of the DOD test and evaluation base is
the Pacific Missile Test Center, PMTC, located at Point Mugu,
California. PMTC is tasked with providing T&E support through-
out the life cycle of weapons system development and deployment.
The particular area of interest in this thesis is its mission
of providing test range services.
The test range consists of two components, the geograph-
ical air space shown in figure 1, and range instrumentation.
The instrumentation component consists of radar, telemetry,
communications, command/control , computer peripherals, recording,
antenna, cryptographic and related equipment and systems
necessary to conduct a broad scope of T&E functions. A graphic
display of these equipments and their inter-relationships is
shown in figure 2
.
The greatest share of the maintenance dollar is spent on
depot level maintenance, DLM, which is defined as all maintenance
functions for range technical systems other than organizational
maintenance performed by operating personnel. At PMTC, the DLM
program is managed by the Design and Fabrication Department
through its Inservice Engineering Division.
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It was at the request of that Division Director that this
writer was asked to investigate the feasibility of developing
a surcharge system to levy instrumentation maintenance costs
on range users. The presumption being that maintenance costs
are a direct function of range use and as such, should be
charged to the various range customers, utilizing an equitable
allocation process.
B. THESIS PLAN
Decision making in a large complex organization such
as the DOD often requires a thorough analysis of relevant
factual and/or theoretical material and a projection of the
results of the decision. Initial research into the mainte-
nance surcharge question showed that the decision should be
considered with respect to three specific areas; DOD funding
policy, industrial maintenance management practices, and
financial management principles. If justification is found
for the surcharge, the next step would be to evaluate the
budgetary effects by utilizing historical and projected data.
The final step would include formulating conclusions and mak-
ing recommendations for implementation.
The research effort consisted of three separate
approaches. An extensive literature search was conducted in
the areas of maintenance and financial management. A second
search was conducted to survey DOD reports, instructions,
management guides and policy statements that were relevant to
the question. A number of on-site visits were made to acquaint
12

the author with the PMTC operation and to enable him to
conduct interviews with individuals throughout the PMTC
organization.
C. THESIS OUTLINE
In the second chapter, background information necessary
to support subsequent chapters is presented. First, a short
history of PMTC is sketched. Then, the DOD and the Department
of the Navy Research Development, Test, and Evaluation Program
is discussed with emphasis placed on the T&E function. Next,
the Defense Acquisition Management System is explained and its
relationship with the RDT&E process is illustrated. Chapter 3
investigates the DOD Funding Policy for Test and Evaluation
Facilities by looking at background, objectives, issues, and
the resultant funding policy. Chapter 4 discusses maintenance
management policy, maintenance decisions, performance, control
systems, and budgeting and concludes with a summary of concepts
In chapter 5, PMTC's financial management system and potential
surcharge implementation problems are presented. Chapter 6
contains an analysis of the surcharge decision and a presenta-




A. PACIFIC MISSILE TEST CENTER
At the end of World War II the Navy moved its Pilot-less
Aircraft Unit from the Mojave desert to Point Mugu, California,
and commissioned the new facilities as the Naval Missile Test
Center, NAMTC. The new location was chosen because of its
access to a large, open sea area, the availability of instru-
mentation sites on offshore islands and on 1100 foot Laguna
Peak, the mild climate, and the proximity of the growing
industrial basin of Los Angeles.
In 194 8, a ten year growth period began for the new
NAMTC. Laboratory, range, and support facilities were construct-
ed and range instrumentation was installed. The testing program
started with land launched missiles and soon moved to air
launched systems. Testing grew in sophistication as weapons
systems became more complex and a great deal of modern in-
strumentation and equipment was introduced.
In 1958, NAMTC was designated as one of the six national
ranges that would be managed by DOD and provide service to all
DOD components and other Federal agencies, in particular those
which dealt with the growing space problem. It was recommision-
ed as the Pacific Missile Range, PMR. Within the next year, the
Navy Missile testing function was separated from PMR for admini-
strative and funding purposes and was established as a separate
field activity under the then Bureau of Aeronautics. It was
14

commissioned as the Navy Missile Center, NMC. The Point
Mugu complex was then composed of three major elements: PMR,
NMC, and the Naval Air Station, which was a subordinate
command of PMR.
During the next ten years, NMC was the Navy's principle
organization for Test and Evaluation of air launched missiles
and weapons systems. It played a major role in the develop-
ment and acceptance testing, production monitoring, and in
in-service engineering for deployed weapons systems. NMC was
instrumental in the successful development and deployment of
Sparrow III, Bullpup, Sidewinder, and Phoenix missile systems.
NMC continued growing during the Vietnam conflict with
most of its effort being in direct support of the operating
Fleet. As the hostilities wound down, its role somewhat
diminished. At the same time, the space program was gearing
down its operations with a consequent effect on the workload
at PMR. It became apparent that during their growth stages
both PMR and NMC had developed duplicate capacities. NMC was
capable of providing total weapons testing services with the
exception of range resources needed for actual launches, i.e.,
launch pads and range areas. In the early 19 70's there were
several consolidation efforts made and in 1975, NMC and PMR
were combined to form the Pacific Missile Test Center, PMTC.
/~Ref. 3/
PMTC's mission is to:
"Perform development test and evaluation, development
support, and follow on engineering, logistic, and
training support for naval weapons, weapons systems
and related devices; and to provide major range,
15

technical and base support for Fleet users and other
Department of Defense and government agencies.
/~Ref. 4, p.l7
PMTC was organized as a matrix management system with a
central Project Management Group executing projects by using
functional line components of the organization. The organi-
zation chart is shown as figure 3. A brief description of
the major organizational components follows.
The Project Management Group is responsible to execute
and control assigned PMTC projects. They are involved with
initial planning, acceptance, approval, and actual management
of the Center's workload. They are tasked with financial
management of assigned PMTC funds. In the matrix organization,
PMG uses the functional directorates to accomplish assigned
projects.
The Systems Evaluation Directorate designs and performs
tests to assist customers in determining their T&E require-
ments. They develop test and evaluation methodologies and
techniques. The directorate deals with weapons systems in
all life cycle stages.
The Fleet Weapons Engineering Directorate is responsible
for managing engineering programs for assigned in-service
weapons systems. It is PMTC's single point of entry for
in-service engineering projects after the completion of T&E
phases and it also provides support service for all elements
of Integrated Logistic Support.
The Range Directorate provides range services, related
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develops, modifies, and acquires range instrumentation systems.
It performs pre-flight operations including operation of range
instrumentation systems, operational planning and scheduling,
ground and range safety, range clearance and surveillance, and
meteorology.
The Engineering Application Directorate provides techni-
cal support services and range instrumentation development and
support. It designs and fabricates instrumentation, equipment
and facilities, and provides meteorology engineering and photo-
graphic services. Of particular concern for the purpose of
this thesis is its task of managing the depot level maintenance
program for range systems and instrumentation.
B. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION
RDT&E, as implemented in the Defense Department, is not
an end in itself, but rather it is a systematic means for pro-
viding the tools for attainment of higher goals relating to
National Defense. It is designated as one of the ten programs
that make up the total product of the DOD planning, Program
and Budgeting System, PPBS , and has been funded with an
appropriation amounting to ten percent of the total defense
budget over the past ten years.
When Congress passed the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958,
the law stipulated- that the Office of Director Defense Research
and Engineering, DDR&E, be ranked above all other assistant
secretaries. DDR&E is the Secretary of Defense's principle
advisor on technology and science, the supervisor of all DOD
18

research and engineering, and directs activities requiring
centralized management. / Ref. 5, p. 1-5/
The Secretary of the Navy has overall management re-
sponsibility for the Department of the Navy, DON. The Assist-
ant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, ASN(R&D),
has the specific responsibility of managing DON RDT&E activities
as well as oceanography and ocean engineering affairs. He has
financial management responsibility for the Navy's RDT&E
appropriation. Figure 4 shows the DON organization chart with
the key members of the RDT&E management team highlighted. The
Director, RDT&E, (code OP-098) , is assigned to the Chief of
Naval Operations, CNO, and is "double-hatted" to provide staff
support to ASN(R&D) and to execute RDT&E programs at the
operational Navy level.
The CNO manages the operational and support forces and
his role in RDT&E is that of a "user" of a potential end product.
He determines what capabilities are needed for future operating
forces, appraises the military worth of new technology and
appraises the various RDT&E output in terms of military value
and cost.
The Chief of Naval Material, CNM, manages the Naval
Systems Commands and his role in RDT&E is that of a "producer".
He translates CNO operational requirements into hardware
systems, manages the technology base development, defines the
capabilities of advancing technologies, develops detailed
plans for RDT&E to satisfy approval requirements in system
acquisition, and oversees implementation of the System Commands
RDT&E programs. CNM supervises a matrix organization that is
19

used to integrate the RDT&E effort required to develop complex
systems. Project Managers are assigned to projects that cross
functional areas, system commands or service components. The
intent of the organizational structure is to focus the RDT&E
effort on output or purpose as contrasted to the functional
or discipline approach used in industry and universities.
Planning the RDT&E effort must balance with the whole
Navy planning process to provide maximum progress in Naval
operating capability that will be required to implement future
strategy. /Ref. 5, p. 2-4/ That strategy is worked out in the
long range planning process developed for direct inputs into
the DOD joint planning process. In turn, these planning
objectives, generated as part of the PPBS, formulate the DON
Five Year Plan which is the approved program by which the Navy
is funded.
RDT&E output includes more than hardware. The goal is
a total system of operational capability including hardware,
support equipment, trained crews and maintenance personnel,
facilities, consumables, spare parts, and technical and
operating information.
The RDT&E function may be thought of as two processes,
one of invention, one of innovation. Invention is concerned
with new options, innovation with exploiting options by de-
veloping military capabilities that they make possible. On
this supposition, the RDT&E program is structured into six
categories, with the first two dealing with invention and




Test and Evaluation, T&E, includes all physical testing,
experimentation, and analysis performed during the course of
the conception, development, introduction and employment of a
weapons system. /
—
Ref. 5, p. 3-77 T&E is performed to generate
information needed for development, acquisition milestone de-
cissions, and effective operational utilization.
It is DOD policy that acquisition programs are to be
structured, and resources allocated, to ensure that demonstrated
actual achievement of program objectives is the pacing function.
Obviously, the T&E objectives must bear a meaningful relation-
ship to required capabilities. For acquisition milestones,
independent evaluation is mandated. This means that an organi-
zation with a vested interest in selling the program can not
have unilateral control of the T&E process. The Operational
Test and Evaluation Force OPTEVFOR, is the Navy's independent
evaluator and is assigned to the CNO . The experimental air
squadrons stationed at PMTC are assigned to OPTEVFOR, and are
organized to perform operational T&E functions in consonance
with PMTC missions.
Despite what the anacronym may suggest, T&E is not simply
a follow on to R&D. It begins at the earliest phases of a
project with experimental testing of scientific hypothesis
through the system's deployment. A T&E program is implemented
as a range of events which are all an integral part of the acqui-
sition process to coincide with the decision milestones.
/~Ref. 6, p. 7/
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T&E is divided into two distinct parts, Developmental Test
and Evaluation, DT&E, and operational Test and Evaluation, OT&E.
DT&E is conducted to assess the engineering design and develop-
ment process and to verify that a system has attained technical
performance objectives and met specifications. The purpose
of OT&E is to estimate a systems operational effectiveness and
suitability, and to attempt to predict how the system will
perform when deployed. OT&E is performed by the same type of
personnel who will eventually use the system and, therefore,
is conducted in an environment that approximates the expected
operational environment.
The financial management for RDT&E has the following
objectives
:
1. Estimate the needs for resources to implement plans.
2. Be able to justify annual resources.
3. Assist in decision making.
4. Assist in optimizing resource utilization by:
a. Identifying all costs of work performed by
both end product and performing activity.
b. Reporting performance vs. plan to both
installation and program management.
5. Minimize duplication in records and reports.
6. Maintain, meaningful aggregations and summaries of data.
_7. Reduce volume and increase usefullness of reports.
/ Ref. 7, p. 1-47
As shown on the DON organization chart fugure 4, the RDT&E
management responsibilities are spread throughout the depart-
ment. The RDT&E appropriation is centrally managed by ASN(R&D).
The appropriation includes procurement, development and
installation operations authority but does not include funds
for military pay. Operating budgets at each command echelon
are accompanied by program controls which relate to program
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C. DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT
Traditionally, weapons procurement was managed completely
by the individual military components with little influence
from DOD. As weapons systems became more expensive, the acqui-
sition mistakes became more expensive There were numerous
examples of duplication of procurement effort and many cases
of development that continued long after initial test data
indicated the project should be cancelled. Furthermore, many
weapon systems were developed and deployed without any compre-
hensive planning to integrate them into an overall strategy.
/~Ref. 8/
When Robert McNamara was appointed Secretary of Defense
in 1960, he recognized the acquisition problem as being sympto-
matic of the deficient DOD planning process. He instituted
PPBS and other complementary systems designed to coordinate
the planning of individual military components and to central-
ize more decision making at the DOD level. In the systems acqui-
sition process, this centralization was carried to the extreme
of the Secretary becoming personally involved with working level
detail in the infamous F-lll misadventure.
The philosophy reverted with McNamara 's successor, Melvin
Laird. Laird and his Deputy, David Packard, wanted to reorgan-
ize and decentralize systems acquisition so that the DOD com-
ponents identified needs and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, OSD, established the acquisition policy.
24

For management purposes, the life cycle of a weapons
systems development is divided into four distinct phases, as
shown in fugure 5. Major programs are those with an estimated
RDT&E cost in excess of $50 million or an estimated production
cost in excess of $200 million. /
—
Ref. 9, Enclosure 17 DOD
requires that a review be conducted of all major programs to
insure that they are ready for transition from one program
phase to the next and that the Secretary of Defense makes the
transition decision based on the review inputs. The review
is conducted with the military component submitting a Decision
Coordinating Paper, DCP , that describes the program, its pro-
gress, risks, costs, and plans for further development. The
DCP is studied by the Defense System Acquisition Review
Council, DSARC, at the OSD level and a "milestone decision"
recommendation is given to SECDEF. This is commonly referred
to as the DCP/DSARC process and is the essence of the acqui-
sition methodology. A more detailed description of its
application in an acquisition cycle is given as Appendix 3.
Test and Evaluation is critical to the acquisition
process. The DCP includes more T&E data at each milestone
and identifies critical issues and areas of risk to be apprais-
ed in subsequent planned T&E. Results of T&E continually up-
date critical issues. Overviews and test plans are syn-
chronized with decision milestones.
A subsystem- of acquisition management is the Selected
Acquisition Information and Management System, SAIMS. The



























WBS , which categorizes and aggregates acquisition costs to
establish a data base for estimating future cost of defense
systems. The estimates are used in planning, budget prepara-
tion, contract pricing, and program measurement. Figure 6
shows the components of the system and its relationship to
the DOD Resource Management System. RMS.
System Acquisition can be thought of as the output of
RDT&E, but the two systems are interwoven to such an extent
that the idea that one causes the other is not correct.
Neither system can exist without the other. A more accurate
description of their relationship would be that their combined
efforts are required to produce an output that is a total
system capability which will optimumly meet its strategic
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III. FUNDING POLICY FOR TEST AND EVALUATION FACILITIES
A. BACKGROUND
In 19 70, President Nixon commissioned a Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel to make an intensive study of the DOD to identify
problem areas and recommend corrective action. The Panel
selected Operational Test and Evaluation as an activity that
merited specific attention and assigned a task group to con-
duct an inquiry into the DOD program.
The group identified a number of critical issues includ-
ing the question of how T&E should be funded throughout the
DOD. They sought to determine if changes in the method of
funding would improve the effectiveness and/or the efficiency
of the OTScE function.
They found that the funding of test ranges and related
facilities was inconsistent throughout the DOD and that there
was no standard accounting system used in the financial manage-
ment of the individual activities. Some activities preferred
industrial funding because they felt it forced planning and
revealed inefficiencies. Others thought industrial funding
was inflexible and that a minimum level of effort funding
was necessary to insure T&E responsiveness. The accounting
systems used to charge T&E customers for reimbursable ser-
vices varied and in most cases it was not clear that the
direct costs of using ranges were sufficiently identifiable




The task force also found that tests for specific systems
were budgeted by the Project Manager while the operation of a
T&E facility was funded with various categories of the RDT&E
appropriation or with Operating and Maintenance funds. There
was no accurate estimate of the total T&E cost of any of the
service components. They recommended that the services budget
separately for an OT&E program element. /
—
Ref. 10, Appendix F.
p. 9/ There was some protest from service components that
such a change would reduce flexibility in reprogramming re-
strictions imposed on program element level budget execution.
The task group further concluded that the inconsistencies
between services and between ranges had forced T&E customers
to utilize a "free" facility vice an industrially funded one.
Even if an industrially funded activity had reduced its over-
head rate to where it met some sort of efficiency standard,
the rate may have been just enough to cause the Project Man-
ager to reduce his test program.
The panel suggested that funding should be uniform
throughout the services. A minimum level funding should be
provided to maintain capability, provide for "housekeeping",
and to pay for indirect costs. In turn, the Program Managers
should budget for, and receive, adequate funds to pay for the
I
direct costs of their program as well as any special instru-
mentation requirements. They also advised that it would be
beneficial to have the capability to identify T&E funding
requirements by project. They concluded that:
31

"Range funding and cost accounting were problems that
needed high level attention and decisions and could
fruitfully be the subject of subsequent study effort."
/Ref. 10, Appendix F, p. 117
In 19 71, the DOD conducted an internal study of the
Department's RDT&E Base which came to many of the same con-
clusions concerning funding as the Blue Ribbon Panel had
the previous year. In response to these findings, Deputy
Secretary of Defense, David Packard, directed that an exami-
nation be made of the application of current funding policy
at Major Defense Test and Evaluation Support Activities.
The study group was chaired by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense (Systems Policy and Information) and its membership
was drawn from the Comptroller and RDT&E leadership of the DOD
and the component services. The group reviewed funding policy
and practices at twenty-six Major Defense T&E Support
Activities, examined the strengths and weaknesses associated
with alternative funding methods and recommended the re-
vission of the existing policy in order to:
"achieve more uniformity and to encourage greater inter-
Service and join use of limited Defense resources avail-
able to support test and evaluation." /Ref. 11, p. 1/
The research methodology included an extensive review
of existing directives and prior studies, interviews with
management personnel at many of the twenty-six activities, and
a representative sampling of Project Managers and others who
were the major users of those activities.
A general conclusion reached in the study was that the
major test and evaluation facilities operated under a set of
funding policies which had become exceptionally complex. The
32

complexity was due to in part to suboptimization of the various
players in the T&E process. The Commanding Officer of the
facility was concerned with supplying the proper mix and
quality of services to a wide spectrum of customers. He was
constrained by civilain ceiling points, operating budgets, and
limited opportunities for instrumentation improvements. The
program Manager had to deliver a weapons system that would
add to the operating force capabilities while adhering to
rigid technical performance specifications, and he had to do
this within budget and schedule. The professional test and
evaluation community focused on providing the technical skills
required to insure that every development project was conducted
in a manner that would produce optimum results, again con-
strained by budget, schedule, and the technology itself. The
operating forces which seemed to be habitually tasked with large
missions and given scarce funds, often attempted to satisfy
training requirements on an available, relatively inexpensive,
T&E function. The Congress, as overall appropriator of funds
was dually concerned with total cost of the weapon system acqui-
sition and the operating costs of the T&E support facilities.
Finally, the Office of Management and Budget was worried about
national demands on scarce resources. /Ref. 11, p. 9 5/
The funding policy for RDT&E has been established by
two DOD Instructions, 7220.24, "Accounting for Research and
Development", and 7220.5, "Research and Development Program
Budget Costs-Definitions". The policy applied to most of the
major T&E support activities , but it allowed flexibility to
33

provide various amounts of institutional funding where the
managing component thought appropriate. This flexibility
led to variations in financial management of individual activ-
ities which ranged on a continuum from total institutional
funding with resultant "free" services to users, to industrial
funding where users were charged all direct, indirect, and
general overhead costs
.
The study found evidence that these variations in funding
policy and user charging systems had forced customers who had
planned valid, required T&E at a given activity, to either
cancel a test or test in a cheaper, but perhaps less effective
manner. Other reactions were to limit the test itself which
risked producing inaccurate or invalid conclusions , or even
deferring a test in hopes that the funds might become avail-
able. /~~Ref. 11, p. 71/ This was obviously not in consonance
with the overall RDT&E/Systems Acquisition goal of providing
the best weapons system possible for the least amount of
expenditure.
B. INSTITUTIONAL VERSUS USER FUNDING
Institutional versus user funding was the basic question
to be answered in formulating a new funding policy. Should
users of T&E support facilities pay for the total costs of
all services provided? Should the institution providing the
service, the T&E activity, be totally funded through the
service component chain of command? Or more practically,
should a new policy include a combination of user and
34

institutional funding, weighing the fact that funding patterns
influence motivation by having a pronounced effect on a man-
ager's "report card".
Proponents of institutional funding cite the following:
1. The costs of operating and maintaining a test
facility are not a direct function of workload
and institutional funding ensures a minimum level
of T&E capability.
2. It helps assure the proper amount of testing is
being done.
3. It gives the Commanding Officer of the T&E activity
the authority he needs to complete his mission.
Opponents of institutional funding counter these ad-
vantages with equally valid arguments
:
1. It's immediate economies may lead to a user choosing
the "cheapest" T&E support available while ignoring
vital technical support differences.
2. It could lead to the OSD, instead of the Military
Departments, managing the T&E facilities.
3. It tends to be more vulnerable to undefinitized
budget cuts than specific program developments.
4. It does not motivate a T&E activity to tailor
their support capability, which leads to duplication
throughout the T&E base.
As a different side of the same coin, proponents of
user funding list its advantages as
:
1. It encourages cost consciousness in the project
management process.
2. It enables the PM to make cost-effective decisions
in balancing resources between testing and other
aspects of his program.
3. It gives the PM the budgeting authority to match
the program charter responsibility.
4. It clearly identifies costs to specific programs
and is a step closer to the goal of ful dis-
closure for total weapons systems costs.
5. User funding highlights overcapacity in the T&E
base in accordance with the laws of supply and
demand.
6. It is advantageous in light of DOD budgeting
experiences that show it is easier to justify
funds to finance a specific project than to
finance an overhead activity like a T&E facility.
/ Ref. 12, p. 167
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Both funding policies can be defended using valid
arguments that support the position in terms of effective-
ness and/or efficiency of both the T&E and the PM.
C. OBJECTIVES OF A NEW FUNDING POLICY
When Secretary Packard commissioned the study group,
their charter reflected his concern for the cost and per-
formance problems in the acquisition process cited in Chapter
two of this treatise. He specified that a primary objective
of any new funding policy would be that it would not prohibit
the type or amount of T&E a development system required from
being accomplished. This seemed to be the most evident
symptom of the underlying funding problem.
Through their research effort, the study group develop-
ed a set of criteria to evaluate funding proposals that com-
plemented and added to the primary objective. The criteria
were principally aimed at alleviating the complexity problems
discussed earlier in this chapter.
They determined that a funding policy should recognize
the Project Manager's role as established with development
and acquisition policy, and assist him in managing the resources
to carry out his responsibilities. It must enable the T&E
activity Commander to fulfill his mission of providing re-
quired support in an environment that is constantly changing
in response to national defense policy and/or technology.
It ought to recognize the requirement for a measure of stability
in the T&E capability that developed over a long period and
has a high probability of use in the future. It needs to serve
the needs of Congress and OMB.
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The study group was also pragmatic in their view of actual
implementation of any new policy. They set further criteria
that required any new funding policy to be saleable to those
groups that would use it, be clear and simple in application,
and should not force fit uniformity.
Finally, it addressed the standards of effectiveness
and efficiency as follows:
"It should encourage those responsible for test support
to make cost effective decisions concerning the continuance
of the activity's level of capability, and the efficiency
of their operations. It should encourage project managers
and other users of test facilities to make cost effective
decisions relating to total weapon system development costs.
It should encourage managers in the field activity level to
keep their costs at the lowest level compatible with good
service to their customers. It should reinforce meaningful,
cost effective relationships and dialogue between the activity
manager and the user/customer/test sponsor." /Ref. 11, p. 42_7
The concept of uniformity of a funding policy among T&E
facilities deserves more specific attention. Lack of uniform-
ity distorts cost comparisons between projects. A hypothetical
case might involve the development of two similar weapons sys-
tem capabilities which are utilizing different T&E activities,
one institutionally funded, the other industrially funded. If
a milestone decision is to be made for a single full scale
development based on total costs to date, inter alia, then
the wrong decision could be made based on an incorrect cost
total. Furthermore, a Project Manager is often in a position
during the program budget execution, where scarce funds must
be allocated for testing and also for other high priority
development requirements such as a contract modification.. His
immediate solution may be a "cheap" test that is less than
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optimum when looking at total system development. Finally,
nonuniform funding inhibits inter-service use of the T&E
facilities. A Navy PM may need to use an Air Force T&E
facility which has the expertise to supply support peculiar
to the requirements of the Navy's system development. Beyond
inherent parochialism, the PM may balk at paying for the test
if he could obtain similar, though for less valuable, T&E
support at a Navy sponsored activity, which did not charge
Navy users.
The study group considered four alternative funding
policies
:
1. User funding of direct costs at all twenty-six T&E
support activities.
2. User funding of direct and some indirect costs at
all twenty-six activities.
3. User funding of at least direct costs at all except
those designated national ranges.
4. Reaffirm current policies.
It selected the first alternative of user funding direct
costs and the policy was implemented in FY75.
A closing caveat listed in their findings was
:
"No solid evidence was found to prove either institution-
al or user funding significantly inhibits legitimate and
valid testing or that the T&E objectivity is affected by
funding policy." / Ref. 11, p. 99_7
D. MANAGEMENT OF THE MAJOR RANGE AND TEST FACILITY BASE
The major Range and Test Facility Base, MRTFB , is com-
prised of twenty-six facilities, listed in figure 8, and is
considered a national resource. The facilities are managed
by the Under Secretary of Defense for Resources and Engineer-
ing, DUSFR&E, through the service components. DOD provides
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policy direction and guidance, insures capability, and attempts
to achieve optimum utilization. The cognizant service com-
ponent plans and budgets for facility costs and funds indirect
costs. The activity commander is tasked with planning for
current operations and future development. "The entire spectrum
of test resources is viewed with the intention of satisfying
total DOD requirements with minimum duplication." /Ref. 13,
p. 597
Defense policy for the use, management and operation of
the MRTFB is delineated in DOD Directive 3200.11, dated June 18,
1974. It designates DUSDR&E as the cognizant official to review
annual budget and apportionment requests in assessing range
operations and resource needs. It tasks the Service Secretar-
ies with defining specific missions of the activities, program-
ming and budgeting, and providing for the acquisition of range
instrumentation
.
Nineteen of the twenty-six major DOD ranges, including
PMTC, operate under the Uniform Funding Policy established in
FY75 because of their potential for multi-service use.
The specific budget responsibilities at the OSD level
are management and control of the joint testing appropriation,
review of all MRTFB appropriations encompassing eighteen RDT&E
program elements , and monitoring the T&E conducted for major
acquisition programs. In the FY7 8 budget, requests for T&E
related activities in all appropriations were estimated to be
2.7 billion dollars. /"~Ref. 13, p. 6 37
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MAJOR RANGE AND TEST FACILITY BASE
U . S . Army






Aircraft Development Test Activity
U. S. Navy
Naval Air Test Center
Pacific Missile Test Center
Naval Weapons Center
Naval Air Propulsion Center
Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center
Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility
Naval Surface Weapons Center
Naval Torpedo Station
S . Air Force
Space and Missile Test Center
Satellite Control Facility
Arnold Engineering Development Center
Tactical Fighter Weapons Center
Air Force Flight Test Center
Armament Development and Test Center






Test and evaluation is an integral part of the systems
acquisition process. The payoff of effective, efficient T&E
support is maximum military capability using minimum defense
dollars. Funding policy does not create resources. The
objective of the policy was not to assure that more funds in
total would be spent on T&E, but rather that policy which in-
fluences the placement of T&E work and how it is payed for,
should not prejudice the right technical decisions about test-
ing. It further attempts to provide for cost comparability,
elimination of detrimental competition, increasing cost con-
sciousness on the part of both user and the activity, identi-
fication of full costs for each development project and im-
provement in communications between users and support
activities.
At PMTC, many of the maintenance costs associated with
range instrumentation are a function of range use. A minimum
level of maintenance would be required even if the Center had
no customers, but the preponderance of operator, intermediate,
and all of the depot level maintenance is required because of
actual instrumentation use.
The discussion in this chapter demonstrates that the
funding policy has objectives which are contradictory, such
as eliminating competition while maintaining capability while
promoting cost consciousness. In order to meet the objectives
that deal specifically with cost considerations, a portion of
the maintenance of range instrumentation could in fact be con-
sidered a direct cost resulting from range use and could be
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charged to the user. This may be considered a form of
suboptimizing when considering all the objectives of a
uniform funding policy, but it may be necessary to meet





The paradox of the functions of maintenance and the
frequent frustration of its practitioners is cleverly ex-
pressed in the following verse.
"I'm not allowed to run the train
or see how fast 'twill go.
I ain't allowed to let off steam
or make the whistle blow.
I cannot exercise control
or even ring the bell.
But let the damn thing jump the_track
and see who catches hell." /Ref. 14, p. 1_7
In many organizations , maintenance operates in a negative
atmosphere. Its greatest achievements are preventing and
correcting production or service breakdowns. In the first
case, the results are difficult to quantify and merit while
in the second, maintenance is often thought to be culpable
for the breakdown. It has been thought of as the spender of
funds but the producer of nothing. As production has become
more automated and technically sophisticated, the role of
maintenance has grown coincidently in importance but is still
considered a distant secondary operation compared to the
organization's primary production operation.
In this chapter, the importance of the maintenance
function and its potential for successful management will
be examined. Policy and objectives will be established.
The system needed to accomplish the objectives and their com-
posite goals will be outlined. The primary decisions which
43

maintenance management must make are defined and measures of
performance used to evaluate those decisions are discussed.
The cost control and budgeting aspects of maintenance financial
management are presented and the summary relates the chapter
discussion to the thesis problem.
B. POLICY AND OBJECTIVES
The essential purpose for the existence of a maintenance
activity in any organization is to further the objectives of
that organization. The more specific goals which serve that
end are functionally or cost oriented. The former include
maximizing the availability of equipment for production or
service, preserving the value of plant assets by minimizing
wear and deterioration, ensuring operational readiness of
emergency or standby units, and maintaining the quality of
plant assets' output. The cost goal is primarily concerned
with achieving the functional goals in an economic manner
over a long term. Maintenance is a cost oriented activity
with a specific goal to obtain a planned degree of production
efficiency at the lowest possible cost. Any maintenance costs
must be analyzed with respect to the avoided consequence of
failure
.
Efforts to control maintenance have lagged behind other
management control practices. One causative factor may have
been the difficulty involved in developing qualitative analysis
techniques for maintenance functions. The increased use of
Operations Research in the business community, coupled with
top management's detailed interest, has lent the concept of
maintenance management a new found respectability.
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Terotechnology is another word for resource or life
cycle management. It describes a system, or integrated
approach to managing physical assets. The term was coined
in Britain in the early 1970' s and is defined by their Depart-
ment of Industry as:
"a combination of management, financial, engineering
and other practices applied to physical assets in
pursuit of economic life cycle costs; it is concerned
with the specification, and design for reliability and
maintainability of plant, equipment, machinery, buildings
and structures with their installation, commissioning,
maintenance, modification and replacement and with feed-
back on information on design, performance and costs."
/ Ref. 15, p. 125/
This concept has given rebirth to an old dicipline, main-
tenance management.
The modern maintenance function may be displayed graphical-
ly as shown in figure 9.
—
Ref. 16, p. 5j Planned maintenance
can be defined as the total of all service functions aimed at
maintaining and improving reliability performance character-
istics. Prevention activities include inspection, operator
and running maintenance, lubrication, testing, adjustments and
replacement or removal of elements. Corrective activities in-
volve minor repairs and depot level maintenance. Unplanned
maintenance is analogous to breakdown or emergency maintenance.
A basic precept in Terotechnology is that maintenance is
less costly at the incipient stage of failure and therefore, it
is incumbent on management to maximize planned, and minimize
unplanned maintenance. However, there are diminishing returns
to the planned effort and the elimination of virtually all

















maintenance, the work demand controls the maintenance program
and its organization.. Despite the "drama and excitement" often
surrounding emergency maintenance, the snap decisions, panic
buying, endless revision of priorities and redeployment of
labor, all lower the efficiency and effectiveness of the
maintenance effort.
Conversely, planned maintenance provides the technical
and financial resources to direct and control maintenance
operations to meet the objectives of higher overall plant
maintenance standards and promotes greater cost effectiveness.
Another category is predictive maintenance. It is a
technique which replaces asset components at predetermined
points in the operating life, prior to actual failure. This
is especially applicable to the electronic components that
make up the instrumentation at PMTC. Those components will
wear out and fail at a rate which is statistically predictable
under normal conditions of usage. Usually electronic equip-
ment does not give warning Qf eminent failure and there are
few reliable means available for inspecting and measuring
deterioration. /
—
Ref. 16, p. 6 8/
C. MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
Planning, organizing, and controlling maintenance all
involve a series of decisions. Despite the product or service
output differences, and the variations in equipments used,
most organizations face common decisions in the management
of their maintenance functions. The decision environments
are usually characterized by some uncertainty, but that does
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not justify making them in an arbitrary manner. An obvious
tenent is that a maintenance decision effects the productive/
service output and those consequences must be evaluated.
An initial determination concerns the balance between
preventive and breakdown maintenance. The parameters used
in evaluating the problem are the cost of preventive mainte*-
nance at various levels of effort and the corresponding cost
of breakdowns at those same levels. As shown in figure 10,
/ Ref. 17 , p. 2 77/ , the optimal policy is that maintenance
level where the total costs are at a minimum. The preventive
maintenance functions may range from daily oiling of bearings
to prevent their freezing, to the periodic removal of the
equipment from service for depot level maintenance.
A second type of decision involves choosing to repair
or replace a component, or if failure is complete, the question
involves periodic total quantity replacement. A simple example
of the latter case would be light bulb replacement in a large
facility. Should the bulbs be replaced periodically, in
total, or should they be replaced individually, as they fail?
Inherent in the decision is a comparison of the cost of re-
placement, (labor, material, and overhead), with the cost of
a failure. A light bulb failure may border on insignificant,
but the failure of a command/destruct control system and the
subsequent damage to life, property, and Navy public relations
caused by an errant missile launch could be colossal.
Spares provisioning is a decision that comprises the











negligible inventory but long delays and downtime costs, and
having a number of complete back-up systems with short down-
time but large inventory costs. Interviews with Inservice
Engineering Division personnel responsible for the DLM of
specific instrumentation systems at PMTC related such a com-
promise policy. All systems have an inventory of peculiar
parts and each has one or two complete critical components
which are either crucial to the systems operation and/or have
a procurement leadtime that is excessively long. In some
cases, spares are held in inventory because the original
equipment manufacturer no longer makes those specific com-
ponent parts. Beyond these peculiarities, there are accepted
operations research techniques for managing inventory which
enable the decision maker to optimize inventory and minimize
overall costs.
Periodic equipment inspection will identify potential
problems and reduce breakdowns. An optimal inspection pro-
gram must be chosen. Figure 10 can be used to show that there
is a "level" of inspections where the combination of inspec-
tion and breakdown costs is at a minimum. The "level" of in-
spection would be comprised of two parts, intensity and fre-
quency. Short inspection (maintenance) costs with a
corresponding high equipment reliability, with long intervals
and less intense inspections having the opposite effect.
Overhaul is a restorative maintenance action which is
taken before equipment has reached a defined failure state.
In fact, it is a form of preventive maintenance used to reduce
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the frequency of failures. The overhaul of depot level
maintenance function lends itself to analysis using figure 10.
The question to be addressed are: How often and to what
degree should depot level maintenance be performed?; and,
Is maintenance a function of the equipment age and complexity?
A maintenance management system whose purpose is to make
the aforementioned decisions is characterized by three phases;
planning, execution, and appraisal. The system must support
the organization's specific maintenance goals without over-
emphasizing procedural policies. However, the system should
not sacrifice valid procedural requisites to achieve a flex-
ibility and response to operational requirements that are
economically unfeasible.
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command, in its pub-
lication "Maintenance Management of Public Works and Public
Utilities", list the elements which are germaine to an effective
maintenance management system. The initial element is an ac-
curate, detailed inventory which lets management know the quan-
tity and quality of the maintenance requirements. Next, are
maintenance standards , which by necessity vary as a function of
a particular equipment's use and its relation to the organiza-
tion's objectives. The system should cause the majority of
maintenance work to be generated through inspections which
are a controlled, active approach rather than breakdowns which
are uncontrolled, passive approach. A simple control point of
work reception and work input control from acceptance to com-
pletion is necessary for successful execution. Finally, all
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work should be planned, programmed and scheduled, and the end
product must be appraised.
D. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
The appraisal function of the management process requires
that the actual results of the executed program must be measured
against the planned results and the difference must be analyzed.
The measurement should be easy to calculate, easy to interpret,
should identify poor past management decisions and indicate
corrective action.
Performance may be expressed in terms of efficiency.
However, developing criteria for measuring the efficiency may
be difficult. From the vantage of the operating departments,
maintenance is efficient if it prevents breakdowns or if it
provides corrective action in a "timely" manner. The con-
troller would consider the maintenance effort efficient if it
remained within the budget. There are numerous criteria,
which are not independent, and under each, a significant
amount of "inefficiency" will exist to permit a sort of maxi-
mum "joint efficiency".
In maintenance management, efficiency is the output ex-
pressed in terms of cost savings of all maintenance functions,
expressed as a percentage of the input cost of those functions,
in terms of expended resources. Quantifying either of these
costs is difficult at best but impossible without detailed
cost data.
Effectiveness is a measure of the difference between
actual and planned maintenance performance. Its use requires
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the establishment of detailed goals and objectives and a
methodology for evaluating and comparing planned and actual
inputs and outputs
.
Maintenance effectiveness can be measured with indices
that can be used to show time trends or comparisons between
similar functions within or even outside the organization.
Some basic indices may be the estimated mean time between
failures, the mean time to repair, equipment availability,
and maintenance/production cost ratio. —Ref. 15, p. 9 3_7
If indices are used, they should incorporate factors
which are under the control of the people held accountable
for the performance of the functions the indices are measuring.
For example, at lower levels of line supervision the indices
may be man-hours/unit or work while at the maintenance super-
intendent level it might be percent of operating time
availability.
E. CONTROL SYSTEMS
Control systems require customizing to fit specific
organizations but most utilize common tools such as work re-
quests, preventive maintenance procedures, maintenance
scheduling, job specifications", inspection, schedules and
reports, inventory records and work priority rules. /Ref. 16,
p. 56_7 Of specific interest is cost control which is dependent
on the aforementioned for data, analysis, and implementing
corrective action. The control of maintenance costs is the
process of obtaining a specified degree of production/service
at the lowest possible costs. The control effort may be
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applied through actual maintenance procedures or through the
equipment being maintained. The control target is a result
of the previously discussed analysis that determines the
minimum total of maintenance and breakdown costs.
The key to accumulating cost data is the job cost card.
It should indicate what type of maintenance was performed on
what equipment, how much cost was involved in labor, materials,
and overhead, and what responsibility center incurred the ex-
pense. Data could then be aggregated in summary reports which
could put maintenance into perspective as a component of total
cost, its relation to direct operational labor, the value of
equipment or any other performance measures already mentioned.
The specific elements of cost are equipment, supplies,
labor, departmental overhead and plant overhead. Cost control
could be applied to the efficient expense of all those input
resources. One method of control might involve the distri-
bution of the overhead to operating departments using an
allocation base of total dollars spent, man-hours used, or
total value of equipment maintained. /Ref. 18, p. 5-9/
Specific cost targets could then be developed using
the work standards used in scheduling and measuring work per-
formance. Their objective would be to encourage reduction of
actual costs to an "attainable" standard cost. The targets




F. BUDGETING FOR MAINTENANCE COSTS
The form of the maintenance budget is determined by the
organization's requirements as a whole. Maintenance budgets
are subjected to fluctuations in both supply (funding) , and
demand (increased operations), but in most cases, a basic
authorization is required to maintain equipment in minimal
condition.
Budgeting preparation requires that detailed estimates
be made of the components of the- maintenance function. This
facilitates the frequent adjustments required by allowing
for reduction in effort of entire components vice a reduction
which may effect parts of various components. In some circles
these reductions are referred to as vertical cuts when the
component support is being cut as a program and horizontal
cuts when cuts are made without regard to any individual
system. Careful and judicious application of cuts can prevent
a ten percent budget reduction which causes a 100 percent
equipment deadline.
Lump sum budgeting for the entire maintenance function,
or its few major parts, based on passed experience vice planned
action, may satisfy broad organizational financial planning but
is unsatisfactory as a budget for maintenance control.
The budget process must specify the responsible individual
for various components of the maintenance function. Costs may
be allocated to production/service departments for "costing"
purposes , but the individual with the authority to decide
what maintenance to order must also have budgetary responsi-
bility. Preventive services which are provided continually,
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such as lubrication, are budgeted as a standard rate per
period or as a unit service charge. Those which are rendered
on demand are more difficult to budget for. One solution is
that the production/service departments be responsible for
the number of maintenance calls, and maintenance management
for the unit cost of service.
The type of budgets used in maintenance management are
classified as fixed, flexible and step budgets:
Fixed budgets make no allowance for variations in
planned maintnenance. Maintenance costs are fixed in the
short run budgetary period.
Flexible budgets vary with output, which in the pro-
duction/service department is readily measured, but often
difficult to measure in the maintenance department. However,
the usual correlation between operational levels of equipment
and resultant levels of required maintenance allow for flexible
budgeting. It could be useful to develop hourly rates for
costing maintenance work but it would be relatively ineffective
as a control of maintenance costs. /Ref. 19, p. 6 8/
Step budgets are essentially a series of fixed budgets
developed for a successive range of output expressed in a
measure of production/service such as hours. At PMTC, each
instrumentation system, such as the FPS-16 radar, could have
a budget designated for operator, intermediate and depot level





The objective of maintaining the range instrumentation
at PMTC is to provide an established level of T&E capability
at a minimum cost. Terotechnology offers an integrated
approach to resource management which would be of particular
significance to the maintenance manager. The minimum mainte-
nance requirement to assure range capability must be insti-
tutionally funded because of its independence from range use.
The management decisions essential in planning and
control of maintenance are aided by various techniques which
optimize functional requisites while minimizing costs. Certain
inventory and replacement decisions would require institutional
funding because of their "big ticket" nature. On the other
hand, depot level maintenance could be funded by applying a
surcharge to instrumentation operating hours. If Depot Level
Maintenance is scheduled for every 10,000 hours of operation
and costs $100,000 to perform, then users could be charged a
$10 /hour DLM surcharge.
A planned maintenance system will lower repair costs,
minimize loss of service due to breakdowns, improve input
resource utilization, prolong equipment life and improve cost
and budgetary controls. By its nature, planned maintenance
requires "front-end" dollars which would initially require
institutional funding as a corpus , and could later be recouped
with a user charge.
Performance measurement is dependent upon cost data
which can be determined without regard to funding source. If
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user funds were depended upon to meet maintenance standards,
a change in activity level could frustrate that goal. Further-
more, corrective action may be difficult to implement if it is
dependent on user funding.
Control may be strengthened by grouping maintenance costs
as to how they are incurred. A fixed budget would satisfy
minimum maintenance requirements and lends itself to institution-
al funding. A flexible budget should be used to control main-
tenance costs which management intends to control with operations
or some other index of activity and it lends itself to user
funding.
The optimal policy of maintenance funding may be entirely
institutional. The concept of minimum level of preventive main-
tenance cannot be dependent on fluctuating service volume.
Rising levels of activity obviate increased maintenance costs
and it could be suitable to charge users for that increase.
The danger lies in becoming too dependent upon user funding for
preventive maintenance.
Conversely, an expedient way to reduce maintenance costs
is to reduce maintenance. Institutional funding chains are
susceptible to this type of thinking in times of unexpected
reductions or reporgramming of funds. Maintenance is fore-
saken for operational requirements because of lack of short
term visible damage and managements' desire to meet the re-
quirements of higher authority.
58

V. PACIFIC MISSILE TEST CENTER FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A. INTROUDCTION
Financial management at PMTC is delegated throughout the
organization at all levels of supervision. In accordance with
Navy policy, there is a comptroller department at PMTC. As
specified in the Navy Comptroller Manual, the department is
established to maintain an integrated financial management
system that assists the line management in carrying out the
activity's mission. Through that system the comptroller is
responsible for:
"....Collection of obligation, expenditure, cost
and other accounting and operating statistics data;
Review of program performance against the financial
plan; " / Ref. 20, paragraph 012120/
The principles that underly the structure of financial
management systems both within the DOD and the private sector
are discussed in Appendix C.
B. MODIFIED NAVAL INDUSTRIAL FUND
PMTC is a chartered Naval Industrial Fund Activity, but
is classified as a modified NIF activity because some Departments
are not operated under the NIF charter. As such, most opera-
tions are funded through a revolving, working capital fund that
is called a "corpus". In providing services to range users,
the cost incurred are charged to and payed for by the corpus.
The corpus is subsequently reimbursed for those costs when the
range users make payment for services rendered. The user is
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CYCLE OF OPERATIONS UNDER NIF FINANCING
DIRECT DIRECT OTHER PRODUCTION GENERAL







billed for the total cost incurred by PMTC in providing the
service, including overhead, as work is accomplished. This
process is shown in figure 11. ~~Ref. 21, p. 2-10/
As stated above, PMTC is somewhat unique in that some of
its components are not operated under the NIF charter. The
range/test cost centers, which include the Inservice Engineer-
ing Division, are considered a part of the Military Range and
Test Facility Base, MRTFB, and as such operate under the UFP.
These cost centers charge customers only for direct costs.
Their overhead is funded institutionally, by the Department of
the Navy, under program element 65864N. /Ref. 21, p. 2-3/
Unlike the NIF, these funds are dependent upon the Congressional
appropriation cycle and are subjected to higher level revision
in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.
In order to facilitate overall financial management at
PMTC, the comptroller has established administrative pro-
cedures to assimilate the administration of the range/test
cost centers into the NIF environment. Those cost centers are
required to budget both direct and indirect costs. The direct
are charged in the same manner as NIF charges. The indirect
portion is equivalent to the production expenses in a standard
NIF cost center and is subjected to the same overhead review
and approval process as the NIF cost centers. Unlike those









































PMTC's direct fund administration is a process of:
"planning, accepting, managing and controlling fund auth-
orizations received or reimbursable orders from external
customers requesting work or services to be performed
by the Pacific Missile Test Center. Inherent in the
funds administration process is the continual review of
actual costs versus planned costs at various levels of
management." / Ref. 21, p. 3-117
Figure 12 /Ref. 21, p. 3-57 illustrates the documenta-
tion involved in a life cycle of the funds administration
process through the management steps of planning, executing,
controlling and evaluating.
C. SURCHARGE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
Almost any policy implementation would have problems
to overcome. This is especially true in an organization
as large and as complex as the DOD. Realization of a main-
tenance surcharge system involves four general areas in
which obstacles must be overcome; budgeting, rate development,
accounting procedures, and contingency planning.
The DOD budget process requires a minimum of two years
between requesting funds and receiving authorization to expend
those funds. Forecasting T&E requirements from both the ac-
tivity and user perspective is exceptionally difficult due
to the ever changing technological environment. It is further
complicated by budget revisions in the approval stage and
budget cuts in the execution stage. Requiring the user to pay
a maintenance surcharge for the variable element of DLM costs
will aggrevate the existing problem of T&E reimbursable es-
timates agreeing with user budget submissions. However, these
are not new problems and as all the players in the acquisition
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process develop expertise in utilizing the UFP , they should
become less severe. The maintenance surcharge is simply
another "direct cost".
Initially, it will be difficult to develop maintenance
surcharge rates. Historical data is not aggregated in a
conducive manner. An intensive search through existing records,
coupled with the high level of expertise and experience of the
DLM management group, should provide fairly accurate data with
which to calculate the initial surcharges. Subsequently, a
reliable data base can be developed to validate future sur-
charges. Initially, cost estimates will be crucial to
successful implementation.
Rate stabilization is used by NIF activities to recover
their operating costs by using predetermined rates in billing
users for services rendered. The rates remain fixed for a
specific fiscal period even though actual costs during that
period may be more or less than the applied rate. In accord-
ance with NAVCOMINST 7600. 23B, /Ret. 227, components of the
MRTFB operating under DOD's UFP will establish stabilized
rates for direct costs for T&E support. A maintenance surcharge
would thus be part of a stabilized rate including all direct
costs for a specific range instrumentation service.
The accounting procedures used at PMTC are dependent
upon the job order cost system for data collection. The
maintenance surcharge must be applied through this system.
The system is currently functioning under the UFP and is
used for collecting and charging direct labor and material
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costs against the various user programs that are responsible
for incurring those costs. The only adjustment required in
the system is training the personnel responsible for charging
DLM costs. They must be trained to recognize the fixed and
variable portions of DLM and charge either the institutional
or a user fund.
The accounting methodology used to make the actual cost
allocations could work in either of two ways. The first would
accumulate costs in a suspense or clearing account for a
specified period, probably a month. At the end of the period,
the total maintenance costs would be broken into its variable
and fixed components and allocated to users. This would not
meet rate stabilization criteria. The second system would
set the maintenance surcharge rate ahead of time rather than
awaiting actual cost determination at the end of the period.
This method is prescribed in the rate stabilization policy
and is used at PMTC to recover other direct costs by program.
The last implementation obstacle deals with the real
world problems of program cancellation and slips in schedule.
If a user is funded to carry out a T&E plan and the porgram
is subsequently cancelled, the T&E activity should be able to
receive those "planned on" reimbursables . This may sound
contradictory in the concept of DLM varying with range usage
but as a practical matter, a committment to variable DLM, in
terms of manpower and materials, must be made well in advance
of the planned action date. Therefore, some sort of re-
programming alternative must be used to insure the T&E activity
receives those funds it is committed to expense.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. ANALYSIS OF THE MAINTENANCE SURCHARGE DECISION
The purpose of all discussion to this point has been to
present factual and theoretical information that would assis.t
a decission maker in resolving the issue of whether to charge
range users for range maintenance. In this section, that in-
formation will be analyzed and a conclusion made concerning
the decision.
T&E Support plays a major role in meeting the DOD ob-
jective of strategic weapons development and deployment. As
an element of the T&E base, PMTC is charged with maintaining
a minimum level of T&E capability to support a variety of
prospective users. An attendant level of maintenance of
range instrumentation is prescribed in accomplishing that end.
In managing the Depot Level Maintenance Program, the Inservice
Engineering Division insures that the sophisticated electronic
and electro-mechancial equipments which comprise the range's
technical systems are ready to fulfill their specific missions.
Funding is crucial to the DLM Program.
The Uniform Funding Policy, UFP, was instituted after an
exhaustive study effort and its concluding objectives are based
on sound management principles. The combination of the user
program and the T&E activity funding the remaining indirect
costs is a practical attempt to motivate both components of
the acquisition process into achieving higher echelon goals.
Depot level maintenance can be funded within this concept in
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that the minimum level of DLM required to maintain range
capability would be funded institutionally and the DLM required
because of range use would be charged to those users.
Furthermore, the surcharge would assist in meeting
most of the specified UFP objectives. Cost comparability
between user programs would be made with more accurate data
and their individual development costs would be more precise.
The user would become even more cost conscious with respect to
the T&E effort, and communication between the user and activity
should improve. One objective which might be frustrated is
that of prejudicing test selection because of increasing total
user cost. This last problem would be alleviated with proper
budgetary planning to increase user funds in response to the
proposed policy modification.
The only change required in the UPF is in its definition
of direct costs. It is this author's contention that although
DLM costs are not traceable to specific users, their variable
component behaves like a direct cost. If range instrumenta-
tion was not used, the DLM effort would be at that level re-
quired to maintain range capability. The associated cost
would be fixed and its behavior would classify it as a period
cost. Maintenance above that level would increase as some
function of range use. Its actual cost would be variable and
its behavior indicative of direct costs. Thus the proposal
of a maintenance surcharge would include only the variable





A successful maintenance program requires that DLM be
planned, programmed, and scheduled- This requires "hard,
up front dollar committments." However, by definition, the
variable component would require funding only as the volume
of usage changed. This would require management attention to
ensure that as the hours of range use increased, DLM was
replanned to accommodate that increase.
Would the application of a maintenance surcharge provide
a logical and equitable balance between the differing responsi-
bilities and motivations of users and T&E activity managers?
It would with the proper funding policy change. Initially,
maintenance management would be tasked to provide the fixed
portion of DLM and would be funded accordingly. Users would
receive added dollars within their T&E allotment. From that
point on they would be "motivated" by the in-place UFP System
that recognizes the complimentary roles of the Project Man-
ager and the T&E activity Commanding Officer. Both user and
supplier would make decisions that incurred costs and the
responsibility for controlling costs would be shared between
them. The user would have no control over fixed DLM costs,
but by means of his requests for T&E support would in fact
control the quantity of variable DLM. Since maintenance
managers would control the resource inputs to the variable
DLM, both would control variable DLM costs. Beyond this,




The budgetary authority for DLM should be given to those
organizational components which decide what maintenance will
be accomplished. A fixed institutional budget would be re-
quired for the fixed DLM, managed entirely by the T&E activity.
They would use a flexible budget for the variable DLM. Again,
the existing UFP already allows for this division in budget-
ing for established direct costs.
With control and budgetary authority defined, and ob-
jectives established, the performance of users and T&E activity
managers would continue to be evaluated with existing measures
of effectiveness and efficiency.
A possible negative consequence of depending on users
to fund part of DLM is that T&E management may be forced to
delay decisions involving reimbursables until they are in hand.
"Trading institutional dollars that can be expected
to materialize, for reimbursable dollars that are
only available when, and if earned, puts the T&E
facility's financial manager in a position of bet-
ting on the outcome." /Ref. 23, p. 127
There are two key words in the quote. "Expected" is
overly optimistic in describing the procurement budgeting
process , especially when considering the overhead function
of DLM in an overhead activity such as PMTC. "Betting" is
a synonym of poor management. Properly detailed planning can
provide for alternatives when activity levels vary.
From the users point of view, would they be paying for
passed on T&E management inefficiencies? That situation can
be avoided by using a proper allocation method, as will be
shown in the next section.
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In conclusion, a maintenance surcharge would help to
better categorize and aggregate acquisition costs and improve
the data base used for estimating future acquisitions. It
would improve overall RDT&E management by aiding in the
identification and segregation of project costs and installa-
tion costs. The fixed and variable nature of DLM lends itself
to a combination funding policy.
B. PROCESS OF COST ALLOCATION
If variable DLM was traceable to a specific range system
user, then a direct charging system could be instituted to
recover those costs. On site interviews with the various
system managers responsible for DLM revealed that there are
no such explicit relationships. This requires that the main-
tenance surcharge be allocated by some systemic and rational
basis dependent on cost behavior.
In the financial management process , allocation is used
to distribute or apportion expenses to particular cost ob-
jectives that otherwise could not be directly charged. Be-
cause there is no explicit relationship between the expense
and the cost objective, any allocation system is arbitrary
by nature.
The first step in the allocation process is to identify
the fixed and variable costs for each individual range instru-
mentation system. This required using historical cost and
operations data to identify the systems cost behavior at
various levels of activity. The least squares method of
statistical analysis is an accurate way to determine that
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behavior, an example of its use follows. PMTC does not have
the data aggregation required for this analysis so hypothetical
figures will be used.
Considering an FPS-16 radar system that has operated for
various amounts of total hours during the past six months and
has required various levels of DLM, the problem is to separate
the fixed and variable portion of DLM costs as a function of
operating hours. /Ref. 29, p. 136/
FPS-16 Radar









Two simultaneous linear equations can be developed to
describe the data:
XY = a X + b X
Y = na = b X
where
a = fixed cost DLM
b = variable cost DLM
n = number of observations, months
X = activity measure in hours
Y = total mixed costs of DLM observed
Solving the two equations simultaneously be eliminating
a and solving for b:
b = $5.4 7/hour
Then substituting this value in either of the original
equations and solving for a;










In this manner the fixed cost of DLM per month and the
variable cost of DLM per operating hour could be calculated.
This example assumed that the operating hour would be a correct
allocation base in that it would describe a causual relation-
ship with required DLM. The assumption would have been made
intuitively and would have to be evaluated for each range
system using historical data to validate the base for im-
plementation. Once the base was established and the variable
component of DLM was calculated, then the allocation rate,
cost/base, could be determined.
The selection of only the variable cost would be con-
sistent with previous discussion. Allocation of the fixed,
indirect, DLM costs would not be beneficial to management be-
cause those costs would not be controllable by the end user to
whom they would be charged. Decisions made by those range
users would not effect the fixed costs of DLM.
To underscore the potential inequity of allocating fixed
costs, the following example is offered. Again, because actual
data is not available, hypothetical figures are used. Consider
allocating fixed DLM costs between two users when actual use
varies between budgeting periods. /Ref. 29, p. 618_7
FY80 FY81
Fixed DLM Costs 30, 000(a) 30, 000(a)
Trident Range Use in hrs. 200 200
Phoenix Range Use in hrs. 200 100
Total Range Ops in hrs. 400(b) 300(b)




Trident 200 hours @ $7.50 = $15,000
Phoenix 20 hours @ $7.50 = $15 ,000
$30,000
Year 2
Trident 200 hours @ $10.00 = $20,000
Phoenix 100 hours @ $10.00 = $10 ,000
$30,000
In the first year, both programs would share the fixed
DLM costs equally. In year two, the bulk of fixed DLM costs
would be allocated to Trident. This would not be due to any
change in activity by Trident but rather by a decrease in
activity by Phoenix. The end result would be "penalizing"
Trident with increased charges because Phoenix would be
"winding down". Again, fixed DLM costs should be funded with
institutional dollars.
The variable DLM costs could be more accurately de-
scribed as a "surcharge" rather than an allocation since PMTC
would actually charge the user a set rate per unit of service
provided, i.e., dollars/hour of range system use. This sur-
charge should be determined using budgeted costs to prevent
maintenance inefficiencies to be passed on to the user.
A summary of the allocation procedure follows: Identify
and maintain the distinction between the variable and fixed
DLM costs for each range system. Variable costs should be
allocated at a budgeted rate according to an established base
of activity measurement (probably system hours of operation)
.
Fixed costs should be incurred to provide capability and should




The initial step in implementing a maintenance surcharge
system will require final approval from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Confirmation would come in the form
of a revised DOD Directive, 3200.11, which establishes policy
for administering the MRTFB. The chances of approval will be
greatly enhanced by actively seeking concurrent endorsement of
the proposal from other components of the MRTFB. Obviously,
the previously cited principles for RDT&E within the Navy and
DOD must be convinced of the proposals merit as outlined in
this treatise. The request must be participatory in that
users must be given an opportunity for input.
Once initial approval is granted, an implementation
timetable should be established. A minimum of two years is
required to fit the current budgeting cycle. All effected
cost centers should be identified and their personnel
thouroughly indoctrinated with the justification for the change
and the detailed plans for implementation. The existing chart
of accounts and management information reports should be
revised accordingly.
More immediate is the requirement, both for justification
of the policy change and actual implementation, for a detailed
analysis of DLM costs. For each range instrumentation system,
the relationship between the level of activity in operations
and required DLM for that system, must be accurately establish-
ed. This requires analysis of historical data and/or the use
of engineering studies. The number of maintenance hours
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necessary for each, direct hour of systems operation must be
determined and the least squares technique should be employed
to estimate the fixed and variable portions of the DLM services
needed per time period.
The nest step is to set standard rates per system based
on budgeted costs. Then, establish functional holding account
job orders financed by industrial funds which would subse-
quently be relieved by a transfer of charges on a rate basis






1. Office of Naval Research




6. Strategic Systems Project Office (SSPO)
7. Trident
8. Marine Corps RDT&E
9. NAVSUPSYSCOM
10. NAVFAC
11. Director Laboratory Programs
12. Bureau of Personnel
The administering activities are responsible for receiving
budget requests from the field activities and consolidating
these requests with the RDT&E work at their level. They also
list funds according to category and submit this listing to
ONR (6.1), CND (6.2), and Director RDT&E (6.3 and 6.4) for the
budget request. They receive allocations (N/C 219 7) from ONR
and distribute funds on either 2189-1 or NC-140 to Navy activi-
ties. Industry expenditures are accomplished by contract ne-
gotiations, usually at the administering activity level.
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Field Laboratory activities lie directly below
the 12 Administering Office/Management Command levels
in the above diagram.
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THE SIX CATEGORIES OF RDT&E
6.
1
Research (R) . Research includes all effort directed
toward increased knowledge of natural phenomenon and
environment. This is the research-in-science phase.
6.2 Exploratory Development (XD) . Exploratory Development
includes all effort directed toward solution of specific
military problems. This is the research-in-technology phase
6.3 Advanced Development (AD) . Advanced Development includes
all projects which have moved into the development of hard-
ware for experimental or operational test. This is the
initial-application-of-new-technology phase.
6.4 Engineering Development (ED) . Engineering Development
includes those development programs being engineered for
Service use, but which have not yet been approved for
procurement or operation.
6.5 Management and Support (MS) . This category includes
efforts directed toward support of installation or opera-
tions required for general research and development use.
6.6 Operational Systems Development (SD) . Operational Systems
Development is identical to Engineering Development except





Program Support of Other Nations
Program I Strategic Forces
Program II General Purpose Forces
Program III Intelligence and Communications
Program IV Airlift and Sealift
Program V Guard and Reserve Forces
Program VI Research and Development
Program VII Central Supply and Maintenance
Program VIII Training, Medical and Other General
Personnel Activities
Program IX Administration and Associated Activities
B. R&D Categories
Program VI, Research and Development, is subdivided into
the following five categories
:
Category 1 Research
Category 2 Exploratory Development
Category 3 Advanced Development
Category 4 Engineering Development
Category 5 Management and Support
For convenience in considering all programs funded from
the RDT&E appropriation, a sixth category has been set
up which includes all items in DOD Programs other than VI
Category 6 Operational Systems Development
C. Program Elements
Some representative program elements funded from RDT&E
follow:
Program VI Research and Development
R&D Category 1 - Research
61102N Defense Research Sciences
R&D Category 2 - Exploratory Development
62211N Aircraft
R&D Category 3 - Advanced Development
63308N Advanced Sea Based Deterent
R&D Category 4 - Engineering Development
6450 3N Sub Sonar Developments
R&D Category 5 - Management and Support






















01 REACTOR PROPULSION PLANTS
06 ACOUSTIC COUNTERMEASURES
- 09 NEW SHIP DESIGN
BUDGET ACTIVITY
R&D SUPPORT FROM OTHER APPROPRIATIONS
1 RESEARCH (MILITARY SCIENCES)
2 AIRCRAFT AND RELATED EQUIPMENT
3 MISSILES AND RELATED EQUIPMENT
4 MILITARY ASTRONAUTICS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT
5 SHIPS, SMALL CRAFT AND RELATED EQUIPMENT
6 ORDNANCE, COMBAT VEHICLES AND RELATED EQUIPMENT
7 OTHER EQUIPMENT










2 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
3 INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS
4 AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT
5 GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES
6 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
7 CENTRAL SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE
8 TRAINING MEDICAL AND OTHER GENERAL PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES
9 ADMINISTRATION AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES








Initial phase during which technical, economic, and military
bases are established and the management approach is de-
lineated.
Translates operational goals into technical goals.
PRINCIPLE OUTPUTS :
Refined statement of operational need.
Description of alternate approaches considered and decision
rational.
Preliminary description of and performance specification
for preferred system.




Preliminary designs and engineering (Engr) for system are
verified or accomplished.
Management plans made.
Technical and economic bases for initiating engineering
development verified.
Development prototypes built, tested, evaluated.
Development of attainable performance specification for
system.
* Identify alternatives to satisfy the required oper-
ational capability (ROC) assess risks in cost, schedule and
performance associated with each alternative, selection of
preferred alternative via systematic means of evaluation.
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Proposals for engineering development solicited and evaluated.
Full scale development contractor selected (DCP-DSARC II
approval)
.
DECISION TO ENTER VALIDATION PHASE : based on:
System satisfies a military need, is worth cost and is afford-
able within overall fiscal constraints.
Mission and performance envelopes are adequately defined.
Major uncertainties identified and suitable method of
resolution planned.
Preliminary cost and schedule estimates are realistic and
acceptable.
Management approach and program planning are sound.
The Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) - (formerly the
Development Concept Paper)
Thresholds are well defined and provide the flexibility
for accomplishing appropriate trade-offs in the validation
phase while insuring the surfacing of significant problems.
FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT
Completion of design and detailed engineering by contractor.
Low rate initial production (LRIP) prototypes built and tested
to verify final design and produceability
.
Beginning of massive commitment by Government; major adjust-




Production contract negotiated and awarded (DCP and DSARC III
approval)
.
Quantity production initiated, greatest fund commitment.
Production acceptance tests (PAT) conducted to validate
adequacy of the production model.
DOD commitment to program fully public; pattern of deep
involvement and decreasing viable options for substantial
system changes by government.
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Summary of Secretary of Defense
Decisions Over Program Life
Resource annex
A summary document to provide DOD management officials
with essential information about a major system program.
The DCP is periodically updated as the program advances
through critical decision points in its life cycle.




DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION REVIEW COUNCIL (DSARC)
1. Review and recommendation body
2. Meets at request of service
3. DSARC I - Validation (Army, Navy Air Force)
DSARC II - Full scale development (Army, Navy, Air Force)
DSARC II A - Limited production (Navy/Air Force)
DSARC III - Production and deployment (Navy/Air Force)
For Army - DSARC III is limited production and DSARC III A
is full production.
4. Limited attendance
Additional meetings if thresholds or characteristics set in






DDR&E (Chairs DSARC I & II) Secretary
ASD (I&L) (Chairs IIA & III) Program Manager (Presenter)
ASD (Comptroller) Assistant Secretaries (as
requested)
Director, Defense Program Analysis
& Evaluation
ASD (Intelligence) - as required
ASD (Tele-communications) - as
required
OTHER ATTENDEES
DDR&E (Test & Evaluation) - Presenter
Cost Analysis Improvement Group (Craig) - Presenter
Deputy Secretary of Defense - As requested
Members' Assistants - As requested
Chairman, Joint Chiefs Of Staff - As requested
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APPENDIX C - FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
Accounting, according to Webster's dictionary, is "A
system of recording and summarizing business and financial
transactions in books and analyzing, verifying, and reporting
the results." Extending that conventional definition, accounting
is an information system, expressed in monetary terms, which is
utilized by individuals both from within and from outside an
organization, in making decisions about that organization.
Commercial and Governmental institutions use similar
accounting systems but there are two key differences in their
application. The first deals with basic financial objectives.
Commercial industries thrive on growth which involves the ex-
pansion of their capital base. Government, despite the con-
tention of its critics, is not concerned with expanding its
capital base but rather seeks to acquire resources and expend
them in accordance with statutory requirements. The second
involves control. Commercial enterprises have a built in con-
trol device in the profit motive. Government must use statu-
tory, administrative, and budgetary rules to control its
financial transactions. /~~Ref. 24, p. 11/
The fundamental purposes of federal government agency
accounting are managerial control and accountability. The
former requires the accounting system to provide information
necessary for effectiveness and efficient management of its
operations in terms of its allocated resources. The latter
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requires the system to enable management to report on the dis-
charge of its responsibilities for those resources and operations
for which it is held legally accountable. /Ref. 24, p. 81/
The structure of an internal accounting system used in a
government agency should include planned input, planned output,
the relation of actual output to the organizational objectives,
and measure the organizational efficiency which is the ratio of
actual outputs to actual inputs.
In this chapter, such a system is discussed. It is shown
to be basic to the discipline of managerial accounting. Man-
agement's use of accounting systems in the planning and con-
trol functions will be highlighted. The process relating to
accounting to individual behavior will be presented. Then,
basic cost concepts will be defined for the subsequent exami-
nation of cost control, the central issue. The summary will
relate the chapter discussion points to the thesis problem.
B. ACCOUNTING
Accounting is a multifaceted discipline that can serve
a variety of needs as shown in figure 13. /Ref. 25, p. 162_7
Managerial accounting encompasses all of those aspects dis-
played and particularly those which are part of the control
process. The management control function is employed to
assure that resources are obtained and utilized effectively
and efficiently in accomplishing organizational goals and
objectives. Accounting is not the only source, or the most
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person to person communication or for creation and maintenance
of a good control atmosphere." /Ref. 26, p. 4/
Managerial accounting provides data for the internal
use of managers vice the external users of financial accounting
data. It is future oriented as those are the only costs that
can be planned or controlled. There are as many managerial
accounting systems as there are organizations using them and
they are not, for the most part, governed by generally accepted
accounting principles as are financial accounting systems. Its
emphasis is on the managerial relevance of data and of particu-
lar interest in this thesis is its application in cost control.
Management cannot literally control the costs of making
a product or providing a service, but it can and does control
the actions of those individuals who incur those costs. The
control is motivational and uses managerial accounting as an
implementation process. The intention of this "motivational
accounting" is manipulative. Information is deliberately
selected and organized so that it induces the recipient to
respond in a manner consistent with organizational objectives.
It tries to insure that when the manager of an organizational
segment who is responsible for expending resources acts in his
own best interest, he also acts in the best interest of the
organization as a whole.
This process is one of the tenets of Management by
Objectives, MBO. Its aim is to integrate the company's
objectives with the personal goals and satisfaction of its
employees. It provides for the maintenance and orderly growth
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of the organization by means of statements of responsibility
of everyone involved, and measurement of achievement.
Concomittantly
, it helps overcome some chronic problems
of managing managers and professionals. It provides a means for
measuring their true contribution, clearly defines major areas
of responsibility, is a means for determining a managers span
of control, is an aide in salary determination by paying for
results vice efforts and identifies potential for advancement.
/~Ref. 27, p. 10/
MBO enables each manager to establish a mechanism for
self control through the definition of key results and per-
formance standards that he must personally achieve in line
with organizational objectives. Allied to this is the deter-
mination of priorities for improvement, broken down in specific
responsibilities for each manager during a given period.
Accounting information fills two needs in this process.
First, it acts as a scorecard in accumulating information for
measuring performance. Secondly, it directs attention to
deficiencies in performance.
If NBO is not used, this same information is basic to
another control process called Management by Exception, MBE.
In its simplest form, it is a system of identification and
communication that signals the manager when his attention is
needed and remains silent when it is not required. No account-
ing system could make a perfect distinction between those two
situations, but careful design of a system can come close
enough to be a useful management tool.
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The key elements of the system are measurement standards,
projection measures that ensure meeting organizational objec-
tives, criteria to measure progress made toward those objectives,
comparing actual with planned performance and identifying excep-
tions, then taking action to bring performance back to standards
or adjusting the measure to changed conditions. /Ref. 28, p. 15/
The system is totally dependent on a managerial accounting
system for data and control.
Management information needs for the planning and control
function are most often in a cost format. Costs are defined as
a sacrifice made such as expended cash, transferred property,
or services performed in order to obtain desired goods and
services. The definition is accepted and used extensively in
financial accounting. In managerial accounting, the term cost
has a much broader meaning that calssifies various costs in a
manner which fulfills the different information needs of
management. /~~Ref. 29, p. 24_7
C. COST CONCEPTS
Costs are used by the manager to organize and classify
data. The kinds of costs incurred, and the manner in which
they are classified depend on the type of organization. PMTC
provides a service and does not have manufacturing or mer-
chandising costs, therefore, they will not be considered.
Direct costs are those that are directly traceable
to an object, activity, organizational segment, or responsible
individual. Indirect or common costs are not so traceable,
such as indirect labor and administrative overhead. Period
92

costs are a type of common costs which are identified with a
particular time interval. Rent is an example as is annual
level of minimum maintenance. Period costs include all fixed
overhead costs.
A more distinct difference between direct and indirect
costs is their relevance to decision making. Minimum main-
tenance costs would be considered a direct cost to a general
manager because his decisions could effect those costs. An
operations department head would consider them as indirect
because he could not effect them with his decision authority.
Costs are further classified as to their behavior,
specifically their response to changes in the level of pro-
duction or service activity. Fixed costs, such as rent, do
not change with the level of activity. Variable costs, such
as direct labor, do change. Supervisory costs can be an example
of a mixture of both fixed and variable and are classified as
semifixed.
Cost behavior is multi-determinant. A management de-
cission to freeze hiring and prohibit overtime makes the usual
variable labor cost a fixed cost. The longer the time span of
consideration, the more fixed costs become variable costs; and
in the long run, all costs, are variable. From an organiza-
tional perspective, heating costs may be fixed to an operating
department head but variable to the generating department head.
Variable costs are usually affected by decisions made by
operational management and fixed costs are usually affected by
the strategic planning decisions made by top management.
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Direct costing is an accounting method that charges all
fixed and variable costs that can be traced to a product or
service. It excludes period costs that "arise from provision
of capacity for production and keeping capacity in readiness
regardless of the extent to which it is utilized." /Ref. 30. p. 6/
Within relevant ranges of activity, period costs do not vary,
whereas, direct costs are incurred if goods or services are
produced and not incurred if they are not produced.
Conversely, absorption costing is an accounting method
that charges all costs, including period costs, to the product
or service. Unlike direct costing, it does not require trace-
ability to the end product. Thus, this method's advocates con-
tend that the fixed and variable behavior aspects of overhead
costs are immaterial as far as product or service pricing is
concerned. A key difference between absorption and direct
costing is how the two costing methods are controlled by
management.
D COST CONTROL
The steps in the management control process are shown as
a flow diagram in figure 14 /Ref. 29, p. IQj and are shown to
revolve around two separate but related activities, planning
and control. Planning is concerned with what and how, and
control is concerned with attaining the desired results. They
are complimentary to each other and one without the other is
meaningless
.
The essence of managerial control is knowing what is






























if necessary. Effective cost control is dependent on infor-
mation and action with management itself being the process
of converting information to action.
Individuals making decisions cause costs. Controllable
costs are those that can be directly regulated by a given in-
dividual within a given time period. Costs are controlled
by management actions which are directed at those sources
from which the costs originate.
Control of direct costs requires setting standards for
various levels of activity and then comparing actual and
planned performance using variance analysis techniques that
will be discussed later in the chapter. Period costs are in-
dependent of short fluctuations in activity and are controlled
by budgeting for a specified amount of dollars per budget cycle.
Management simply limits the expense of input resources to the
budget quantities regardless of activity levels.
The size and complexity of modern organizations requires
decentralization of decision making. Delegation of that author-
ity is a prime reason for internal accounting. The entire sys-
tem of statements, reports and analyses, schedules, and budgets
is largely designed to let top management delegate yet maintain
control.
Responsibility accounting is a "system of accounting that
relates each cost and revenue item both to the individual who
makes decisions affecting that item and the physical object or
activity that causes the expense or revenue to occur." / Ref. 31,
p. 41/ It collects and reports planned and actual accounting
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information in terms of responsibility centers, that is, the
individual responsible for incurring the cost. This requires
direct cost information.
The control system provides ways to separate cost items
that are controllable by a responsibility center from those
that are not by whether the center's supervisor can influence
costs by his decisions. Direct labor and material costs are
usually controllable and overhead costs such as indirect labor
and general administration are usually controllable in part.
Allocated costs, by definition, are not controllable. ^Ref. 32,
p. 367 They are determined in accordance with an allocation
formula and not by the actions of a responsibility center
supervisor.
A further classification of controllable costs is
expressed as engineered and management costs. Engineered costs
are elements of costs which can be estimated for specific jobs,
if it is known how much direct labor is required to make a
widget, and the prevailing wage rate, then the total direct
labor cost can be estimated. Management costs are discretionary,
they are what management wants them to be. There is no method-
ology for calculating the "right" amount. Training and safety
costs usually fit in this category as do maintenance costs that
are incurred for a management derived functional requirement.
Depot level maintenance uses a combination of engineered and
management costs for planning and control purposes.
Reduction of engineered cost is almost anways beneficial
to the organization. Reduction of management cost is more
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difficult to readily appraise. Foregoing planned maintenance
may be such a reduction that could be quite costly to the
organization in the long run. Engineered costs are usually
a function of activity, management costs are not.
Allocation of service department costs, such as main-
tenance, are generally not useful for cost control. If such
costs were allocated, the responsibility center charged
would have no control over the costs. There would be an
inherent conflict with the operating department contending
that the changes were to high due to maintenance department
inefficiency, and the maintenance department countering that
poor operating practices caused increased maintenance
requirements
.
It is possible to change non-controllable costs to con-
trollalbe costs. If maintenance department costs were charged
to production responsibility centers as part of an overhead
rate, they are non-controllable; if maintenance charged the
operating department a standard amount per maintenance
function, regardless of actual labor or material expended,
and the operational department was responsible for the quantity
of maintnenace requested, then both supervisors control the
costs
.
Another method of effecting the nature of control is by
charging the locus of responsibility for decision making since
all costs are controllable at some level. Centralizing de-
cision making responsibility removes it from the operating





E. BUDGETING AND COST ANALYSIS
A budget is a plan expressed in quantitative terms. It
is built up by responsibility centers and in the absence of
engineered costs, the amount budgeted is a judgment call.
This judgment is made, in accordance with the motivational
concepts discussed earlier, as a joint agreement between a
supervisor and his superior. Most of the budgeting process
involves establishing the permissable level of management
costs.
Its aim is not just to limit expenditures. It has more
useful and constructive goals, i.e., "the budgetary process
is a means for obtaining the most productive and profitable
use of the company's resources via planning and control."
/~Ref. 33, p. 122/
As discussed in the previous chapter, flexible budgets
are a series of alternate budget plans for different levels
of expected activity. By comparing actual results achieved
for a realized level of activity, with the budgeted performance
for that same level of activity, it is possible to measure
efficiency in a meaningful way.
There are some common pitfalls in budgeting. Estimates
are based on assumed conditions and relationships. Allowances
for performance are a factor of volume, rather than time, and
comparisons and evaluations of current information are made
using historical data.
Analysis of all accounting data involves comparisons.
The judgments made about current performance are not derived
99

by using abstract or absolute criteria but rather by comparing
current performance data with other data. Comparative dif-
ferences are called variances. It is of little use to just
know that there is a variance, but the factors that cause the
variance could be all important.
Variances can be the result of inaccurate standards or
a change in conditions which effects performance projections.
If the purchase price of maintenance materials goes up, the
result is an unfavorable material variance. It does not infer
excessive cost or unfavorable purchasing performance. It means
the standard is no longer appropriate. If a reduction-in-force
caused the average wage rate of maintenance workers to increase,
it would result in an unfavorable direct labor variance. The
changed condition has made the performance standard inaccurate,
in terms of dollars. However, the total hours of performance
remains unchanged. The point is that variance analysis must
be directed to uncover the causative elements.
F. SUMMARY
Accounting systems are used by management to assist in
obtaining effectiveness and efficiency goals in operations.
Managerial accounting is a flexible, behavior-oriented tool
that provides the information needed to plan and control
operations. It is the communication medium of motivational
management processes.
Maintenance is accomplished by incurring both direct and
period costs. At PMTC, direct maintenance costs could be con-
sidered any part of operator, intermediate, or DLM charges that
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that were incurred because of actual instrumentation use.
Period costs are those that are required to maintain a
minimum level of T&E capability, independent of the number
of T&E operations.
When absorption costing is applied to the maintenance
function through the operating department or the service
user, all costs would be recovered. If a direct costing system
is used, only direct maintenance costs would be recovered.
If the maintenance director is designated as the responsi-
ble individual for planning and controlling maintenance costs,
then he must also be given the commensurate authority that
make those costs controllable.
Maintenance costs are a combination of engineered and
management costs. As more historical performance data and
procedural manual information becomes available, engineered
costs increase and management costs decrease.
The primary tools of management planning and control
are budgeting and variance analysis. Both are dependent
upon responsibility accounting and cost control. Again,
for maintenance management to effectively use the tools,
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